

DECONSTRUCTING

Descamps

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THREE QUESTIONS:

- **What triggers the enhancement?**
- **What, exactly, was my client convicted of?**
- **Is his prior offense of conviction a qualifying offense?**

WHAT TRIGGERS THE ENHANCEMENT?

- If qualifying offense is defined, go by the definition.
- *E.g.*, “has as an element” clauses, other residual clauses (“risk of injury”/ “risk of use of force”)

A heads-up

- *Johnson v. United States, cert. granted*, 134 S. Ct. 1871 (Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 13-7120) (granting cert. to *United States v. Johnson*, 526 Fed. Appx. 708 (8th Cir. 2013) (unpublished))
- Should mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun be treated as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)?

Undefined offenses

- Given their “**GENERIC, CONTEMPORARY MEANING**”
- **Common-law vs. non-common-law offenses**
- **Don't go by labels!**

WHAT, EXACTLY, WAS MY CLIENT CONVICTED OF?

- **CATEGORICAL APPROACH:** Fact of conviction and statutory definition of prior offense
- **MODIFIED CATEGORICAL APPROACH:** Narrowing statute of conviction using judicially noticeable, reliable documents

Under the categorical/ modified categorical approach

- The focus is always on the **ELEMENTS**,
- **NOT** the facts,

of the prior offense of conviction.

Divisible/ indivisible statutes

- A **divisible statute** is one that
 - “list[s] potential offense elements in the alternative”
 - “comprises multiple alternative versions of the crime”

The modified categorical approach applies **ONLY** to divisible statutes

- **THIS IS SO IMPORTANT THAT IT BEARS REPEATING:**
- The modified categorical approach applies **ONLY** to divisible statutes! It is **NOT** used on indivisible statutes.
(*Descamps*)

Descamps is an example of this.

- The California burglary statute lacked an element of generic burglary.
- But the government used the modified categorical approach to show that, in fact, D had admitted to that missing element in the state proceeding.
- **HELD: Doesn't matter – the statute is indivisible, so modified categorical approach is not used; and, because indivisible statute doesn't match generic burglary, no enhancement!**

Another example:

Your client was previously convicted under a state statute that says: “It shall be unlawful to burglarize any building.”

- He pleaded guilty to an indictment that said: “MR. CLIENT did then and there burglarize a building, to-wit, the dwelling-house of MR. VICTIM.”**
- Was he convicted of “burglary of a dwelling” under USSG § 2L1.2?**

Answer: NO

- The statute is **indivisible**: it talks about only one type of “building,” and the modified categorical approach can’t be used to granulate down below the level of the statutory element (“building”); and
- Because the statutory element (“building”) includes both dwellings and non-dwelling buildings, the statute is overbroad and does not qualify as “burglary of a dwelling.

Using the modified categorical approach on a divisible statute

What can you use to narrow under the MCA?

- **Jury trial:** charging paper and jury instructions (*Taylor*)
- **Bench trial:** judge's conclusions of law and findings of fact (*Shepard*)

Using the MCA where the prior resulted from a plea

- In addition to statutory definition, look at “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” (*Shepard*)
- But remember: as *Descamps* makes clear, you’re looking for admissions to **ELEMENTS**, not just any facts.

The MCA mirrors the *Apprendi* rule

You're looking for the **elements** either

- Found by the factfinder in the verdict, in the case of a trial; or
- Admitted by the D pursuant to his plea.

Quick notes about the charging instrument

- Use only the charging instrument to which the defendant entered his plea!
- Be careful of conjunctive allegations in the charging instrument. Sometimes under state law a plea constitutes an admission to all of those allegations; but sometimes it doesn't.

Remember: the government has the burden of proof

- **So, the government's inability to get prior documents for narrowing should mean that the enhancement will not be applied.**

IS MY CLIENT'S PRIOR OFFENSE A QUALIFYING OFFENSE?

- Once all narrowing is done, then you must assume that the D was convicted of the **LEAST CULPABLE ACT** remaining.
- If the elements of that act don't correspond to those of the qualifying offense, **NO ENHANCEMENT!**

IMPORTANT PRACTICE NOTE

- When you're comparing your client's offense of conviction to the generic offense, make sure that you look at the statute **as it existed at the time of the client's prior offense.**
- Westlaw and Lexis have pretty good coverage of historical state statutes.

***Duenas-Alvarez* and “Legal Imagination”**

- **Some courts have interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in *Duenas-Alvarez* as meaning that you have to actually show a real-life case in which the state of conviction got a conviction for the particular nonqualifying conduct that you say is included in the state state.**

- This is **NOT** a correct interpretation of *Duenas-Alvarez*. See Keller, *Causing Mischief . . .* (cited in paper).
- At a minimum, *Duenas-Alvarez* should not preclude relief where the overbreadth of the statute is clear from the text of the statute or from the pronouncements of the state's highest court.

So, again

- If after narrowing under the MCA, and application of the least-culpable-act rule,
- The **elements** of your client's offense of conviction do not necessarily correspond to those of the qualifying offense,
- **NO ENHANCEMENT!**

